

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY	USSR	REPORT	
SUBJECT	Political Attitudes and Conditions in the Soviet Union	DATE DISTR	1 May 1953 25X1
DATE OF INFO.		NO. OF PAGES	7
PLACE ACQUIRED		REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
		REFERENCES	

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
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25X1

Comments on Soviet Leaders and Politburo

1. [redacted] rumors circulated at Institute 160, Fryazino, which described Malenkov as the director of a commission preparing the standard work on Soviet economics, comparable in importance to Stalin's Short Course. This story, which was frequently repeated in 1949 or so by prominent Soviet intellectuals at Institute 160, was told in the form of a joke. No other details were given concerning this reputed textbook and those persons supposedly writing it. 25X1
2. However, it is possible that there was some truth behind the rumor. As mentioned earlier, Malenkov was considered the leading theoretician of the Communist Party by some of the top scientists and engineers at the institute. Perhaps this

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25X1

- 2 -

explains why the story arose or indicates the possible reality behind the story. Whenever an article or statement by Malenkov appeared in the Soviet press, [] Soviet colleagues paid particular attention, as they considered that the leading spokesman (after Stalin) of communist theory was voicing his opinion. Despite the fact that the practical politician and political theorist are seldom found in one man, Malenkov enjoyed this reputation as communism's leading theorist. He was followed in importance in this respect by several Soviet university professors, experts in Marxist ideology. []

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3. The subject of Stalin's health was occasionally discussed [] at Institute 160. According to the rumors which they repeated, Stalin was seriously ill. However, this represented no new development, as Stalin was reputedly suffering from a chronic illness. [] Stalin at one time had been inclined to drink too much and that he is now suffering the consequences.

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4. []

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[] Molotov was the likely successor to Stalin, as he apparently was the author of more articles appearing in official Soviet publications than any other leading contender. []

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[] Malenkov was most likely to succeed Stalin. []

[] Molotov too old for this position and believed that, if he played any important role in the Soviet government after Stalin's death, it would simply be that of a prince regent.

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[] Beriya was never mentioned as a possible successor to Stalin, although he certainly is one of the most powerful men in the Soviet Union today.

5. Molotov was held in much esteem [] He was considered to be a decent, fine man, much too soft for the job of dictator. [] Molotov was very well liked by his subordinates as foreign minister. They said that, unlike most Soviet ministers or other exalted personages, he took an active personal interest in his subordinates, helping them out whenever possible.

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6. [] ZUZMANOVSKIY, the scientific director and consultant of Institute 160. ZUZMANOVSKIY, a Soviet of Jewish descent from Leningrad, was a very well educated and intelligent man who was unusually outspoken in voicing his disapproval of certain aspects of the Soviet regime. During the war he had been employed at a research institute in Leningrad.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

- 3 -

7. According to ZUZMANOVSKIY, Zhdanov was renowned as a brutal, unscrupulous person among the better educated Soviets. He was held responsible for the unnecessary death and privation brought about by the defense of Leningrad. According to ZUZMANOVSKIY, many Soviets felt that it would have been better to surrender Leningrad and thus save the lives of countless innocent persons. Zhdanov was also held responsible for the mass deportations which took place in the Baltic states in 1946, an action known to and disapproved by educated Soviets. Shortly before Zhdanov's death (Zhdanov was then considered as "number two" man in the Soviet hierarchy), ZUZMANOVSKIY commented in a private conversation [] that Zhdanov was the proper successor to Stalin as he was so brutal. A few other Soviet engineers at Institute 160 who had been previously employed at the Leningrad Institute also expressed in general the same opinion of Zhdanov.

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8. [] the Politburo was not a large organization, had no large number of supervisory committees at its disposal, but simply consisted of its 11 or 12 members. [] the Politburo considered economic plans or directives in any detail but delegated this work to the Council of Ministers or the planning commission.

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9. [] the Council of Ministers was the supreme economic authority in the Soviet government. On one occasion, [] assigned the solution of an extremely complicated technical problem, as no Soviet electronics specialist had the technical background to handle it. This problem was complex, overlapping into the area of responsibility of four or five ministries. [] this particular problem was considered so important that the director of Institute 160 was required to write a report every two weeks on the progress of the project to the "office of the Council of Ministers".

[] the Council of Ministers and not the Politburo was the agency responsible for economic decisions on a supraministerial level.

Comments on Moscow "Doctors' Plot"

10. [] there are several facets and several explanations for the arrest of leading doctors in Moscow on charges of plotting against top Soviet military and political leaders. The most apparent, and in my opinion the most important, reason for this action lies in the fact that it simply represents a continuation and intensification of the campaign against "cosmopolites" which began in 1947 or 1948.

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[] the underlying motive of this campaign is, [] the conviction among Soviet leaders that Soviet Jews are untrustworthy, are potential or real enemies of the Soviet state because of their historical and cultural ties with the West. They thus have taken steps to remove many Jews from positions of authority []

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11. [] primary reaction to the news of these arrests was that they were a logical and not too surprising culmination

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of earlier anti Semitic moves of the Soviet government. The fact that this "plot" was tied in with United States intelligence agencies and an American welfare agency provides the second basis for this step. [] anti-Semitism to be a deep-rooted and intense feeling among most Soviets. By identifying the United States with Soviet Jews and with a series of sinister "murders", the Soviet government has forged a handy weapon for intensifying its anti-American propaganda drive, thus increasing the unpopularity of the United States with the Soviet masses.

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Deportation of Volga Germans in 1946

12.

[] contrary to general belief in the West, the Volga Germans were deported in two actions. One deportation action was carried out during the war, 1942 if a recall correctly, but the great majority of the Volga Germans was deported in 1946.

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13.

[] the Volga Germans were sent to scattered settlements in the area north of Krasnoyarsk, Krasnoyarsk Kray, and remain there to this day. They are engaged in agriculture in settlements located in the valleys of the Yenisey River and its tributaries. Families were not split up but were deported and settled as family units. However, the Volga Germans were forbidden to intermarry in the future, thus guaranteeing that they will die out as a distinct ethnic minority group.

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14.

[] the Volga Germans were not kept in enclosed labor camps but were allowed to live in these villages together with the indigenous populations. However, they were required to sign a statement agreeing to a regulation which prohibited them from traveling more than three kilometers from the particular village where they were settled. Violators of this regulation were subject to five years' imprisonment in a forced labor camp.

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15.

[] a Volga German who had settled in Leningrad before the war. He was deported from there to the Yenisey Valley in 1942 or 1946 but somehow managed to obtain a release from exile.

25X1

Reputed Camp for GDR Prisoners in Tayshet, USSR

16.

[] Willi Drescher, had worked at OSW in Gerlin. [] he had received the national prize of the GDR shortly before his arrest by Soviet authorities in 1950 in East Berlin.

25X1

17.

[] Drescher wrote that he was hungry and freezing and appealed [] for food and clothing. He also mentioned that was only allowed to write two letters per year. Furthermore, the letter was dated two-and-one-half months before the time [] received it. [] mail from Tayshet to the Moscow area normally took about six or seven days.

25X1

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SECRET

25X1

- 5 -

18. From these facts [] DRESCHER had been arrested by Soviet authorities on grounds of being politically unreliable and was being held in a forced labor camp in or near Tayshet.

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[]
[] this camp is set aside for political prisoners of the GDR, as Soviet bureaucracy is too clumsy to make special arrangements for an individual such as DRESCHER.

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[] DRESCHER was neither a Nazi nor a prisoner-of-war, that this camp probably contains persons recently arrested in the GDR as political unreliaables.

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19. DRESCHER was originally nothing more than a toolmaker by profession. However, native intelligence and energy enabled him to climb to the post of chief of vacuum tube production at the Telefunken Corporation during the war. After the war, he was put in charge of the shop producing klystron and magnetron vacuum tubes at OSW and held that position up to the day of his arrest. DRESCHER had no formal training as an engineer and probably did not even attend a technical secondary school.
[] he is strongly anti-Soviet.

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20. []
[] DRESCHER had been arrested in his home by Soviet authorities because of his connections with a certain Dr. HEITZMANN or HEITZMANN. []

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21. [] no indication that any work in the field of electronics is being carried out at Tayshet or that DRESCHER or HEITZMANN were arrested or kidnapped in order to utilize their technical skills in the Soviet Union. It is possible that DRESCHER was engaged in some sort of technical work at Tayshet but this was not the main reason for his arrest.

25X1

[] over Radio Moscow
Tayshet has become an important industrial center. It is quite possible that labor camp prisoners, DRESCHER among them, are required to work there.

Additional Comments on Soviet Attitudes

22. [] at Institute 160, Soviet intellectuals, believed that contradictions in the capitalist world as well as the

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

- 6 -

aggressive potentialities of the Soviet Union (e.g., furnishing arms to revolutionaries abroad) will bring about war between the Soviet and Western camps. They did not believe in the possibility of co-existence of capitalism and Soviet socialism.

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educated people in the Soviet Union clearly understood the possibility that Soviet leaders would start a war if these leaders believed that such a step would further Soviet interests. That is, these people did not believe in Soviet propaganda which held that the Soviet Union, as a peace-loving nation, was incapable of launching an aggressive war.

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23. [redacted] Soviet leaders intend to create a fear of war and a hatred for the West among the Soviet masses by their anti-American, anti-West propaganda campaigns. This propaganda specifically serves as a long-term preparation for war. When the Soviet leaders decide to launch a war against the West, the population will be conditioned to accept and support this step.

25X1

24. The postwar cultural purges in the fields of biology, philosophy, et cetera, were seldom a topic of conversation [redacted] at Institute 160 and failed to cause any excitement among them. Lack of interest and not fear of discussing this topic was the explanation for this situation. Like most engineers or scientists throughout the world, none but a few had wide enough intellectual interests to care about such matters. [redacted] the victims of the Lysenko purge were not imprisoned or sent to forced labor camps but were allowed to continue their work in positions of lesser responsibility.

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25. No purge in the field of physics [redacted] at least none [redacted] at Institute 160 and in the Ministry of Communications Equipment Industry were affected by the postwar purges directed against Western-oriented thinking. It is possible that the quantum theory has been attacked in Soviet journals as anti-Marxist. [redacted] Max PLANCK, as a scientist, and his quantum theory are held in great respect in the Soviet Union. But PLANCK, as a man, has been rejected by the Soviets because he turned more and more to religion in his later years.

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26. With such a large percentage of the Soviet technical intelligentsia destroyed by police actions and the war, the Soviet Union lacks the necessary personnel to carry out many scientific and industrial projects. This shortcoming was keenly felt by many Soviet scientists and engineers at Institute 160. This same group was also aware of its own shortcomings in comparison with Western technological development. They realized the existence of a higher stage of technology in the West and of the more advanced knowledge of Western technical personnel. They were aware of and opposed to the policy of the Soviet government to isolate them from scientific and cultural contact with the West. All these factors taken together represent perhaps the major source of dissatisfaction among the Soviet scientists in that they adversely affect their technical efficiency, their ability to achieve scientific goals.

SECRET

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25X1

- 7 -

27. [redacted] Soviet colleagues frequently joked about recent Soviet claims to prior inventions and scientific discoveries generally attributed to West European and American inventors. [redacted]

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28. [redacted] no Soviet citizen [redacted] took his national and local elections seriously. No one considered them to be of any significance and no one showed the slightest interest in the election campaigns or their outcome. However, few if any Soviets felt that they could risk not participating in an election. It was interesting to note the manner in which election meetings were conducted. Although it was but a mere formality, the gates of the institute were barred after working hours in order to make sure that everyone attended a political rally. Even so, a large crowd of workers always gathered at the gate on such an occasion and tried to force their way out.

29. There was a surprisingly strong interest in religion on the part of all elements of the Soviet population except perhaps among the upper intelligentsia (which is true throughout the world) and among children of school age. [redacted] the local school director carried out anti-religious propaganda which discouraged the children from attending church. However, all other elements of the Soviet population of Fryazino attended the nearest church in the neighboring town of Semashko. Like other Soviet churches [redacted] this church was always crowded to the aisles when services were held. It should be remembered, of course, that perhaps only five percent of all churches in the Soviet Union remain open.

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